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ABSTRACT
Although actor-network theory (ANT) is enjoying increasing interest in
information systems research, we are still in the early stages of understanding
and appreciating ANT’s potential for drawing lessons and developing guidance
for industry practitioners. This paper focuses on extending that practical
understanding. Here, ANT is applied in creating an account of a human-services
firm’s experience in building its first major information system. Several
practical implications are drawn that point the way toward further adapting ANT
thinking for applied use in system-project contexts. Central among the insights
are: the potential value in viewing project leadership in terms of actor-network
management; the need to treat network management more as a matter of
facilitation than control; the importance of recognizing that the effective
management of interests may have to begin with the very constitution of those
interests; the need to understand how indirect representations of key interests
during software construction may break down when the interests themselves are
directly engaged during implementation; the need to manage the particulars of
critical issues on which network stability depends; and the importance of
grasping the interdependence between network stability and adaptability in
design.

INTRODUCTION
Actor network theory (ANT) is
enjoying
increasing
interest
among
information systems scholars. This has been

announced in conceptual works and reviews
(e.g., Boland and Schultze 1996; Doolin and
Lowe 2002; Hanseth, Aanestad, and Berg
2004; Jones 1998; McMaster, Vidgen, and
Wastell 1998; Monteiro 2000; Monteiro and
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Hanseth 1996; Walsham1997). It has also
been witnessed in empirical papers applying
aspects of this perspective to organizational
initiatives (e.g., Aanestad and Hanseth 2000;
Mahring, Holstrom, Keil, and Montealegre
2004; Linderoth 2002; McGrath 2002; Vidgen
and McMaster 1996; Walsham and Sahay
1999; Whitley 1999; Wilson 2002) and at the
industry, institutional sector, and societal
levels (e.g., Bowker, Timmermans, and Star
1996; Fomin, Keil, and Lyytinen 2003;
Hanseth and Monteiro 1997; Marres 2004;
Adams and Berg 2004; Allen 2004; Faraj,
Kwon, and Watts 2004; Whitley and Pouloudi
2001).
ANT’s appeal within the field is
unsurprising. Its foregrounding of technology
as a factor in the workings of human
enterprises, its explicit attention to challenges
posed by divergent interests, and its processoriented perspective provide a compelling

framework for developing rich and convincing
characterizations of information-technology
implementation efforts. Indeed, ANT can
offer several advantages over alternative
approaches to socio-technical analyses of IT –
as the elaborated discussion in the following
section will help to make clear.
To briefly summarize, ANT, in the first
place, compels a dynamic perspective on
implementation phenomena. In contrast to the
static depictions afforded by variance-oriented
styles of research (Markus and Robey 1988),
which at their best uncover only statistical
associations among the factors affecting
implementation, ANT draws the researcher
into direct investigation of the historical
processes by which outcomes follow from preexisting conditions and the strategies of key
agents acting under constraint. Also, with its
attention to competing interests ANT helps to
bring political issues to center stage, in

CONTRIBUTION
This paper makes a contribution to both research and practice in the domain of
information-systems implementation by showing one way in which research might be brought
closer to practice. The paper’s originality rests in its effort to use actor-network theory (ANT) to
draw practical implications for the management of systems implementation. While actornetwork theory has lately commanded considerable attention in IS academic circles, relatively
little has yet been said about how to apply its seemingly esoteric concepts and arcane vocabulary
to situations of practice. This paper addresses that gap.
An intensive field study of a recent project demonstrates how key concepts from ANT
can be used in interpreting the action in a system-implementation effort. The study reinforces
prior ANT research by pointing in a broad way to the value of viewing project leadership in
terms of actor-network management. However, the paper also provides a number of more
specific insights not clearly drawn in prior applications of ANT. Among these insights are that
actor-network management may often be more a matter of facilitation control; that the effective
management of interests may have to begin with the very constitution of those interests
(implying that learning must find a role, when ANT is applied in IS studies); that a crucial
moment in network management will often occur during implementation, when the indirect
representations of organizational interests that underpin software design confront the real
interests themselves; that close attention to the particulars of critical issues can make the
difference between project success and failure; and that system evolution requires managing a
paradoxical tension between stability in the actor network and flexibility in system design.
This research is expected to be of considerable interest to researchers involved in field
studies of systems development projects, and of general interest to researchers engaged in
applying actor-network theory to various problems in the information-systems field. It should
also interest scholars concerned about finding ways to extract practical insights from
theoretically grounded research. While addressed primarily to academic researchers, this paper
may also be of interest to IS managers and practitioners seeking fresh perspectives on the
obdurate challenges involved both in getting effective user participation in systems development
and in integrating new systems into the business processes and work systems of firms.

52

Applying the Sociology of Translation to a System Project in a Lagging Enterprise

marked contrast to our community’s
frequently genteel, conflict-neutral research on
change.
ANT accordingly shares some
advantages with stakeholder approaches;
however, a key difference lies in ANT’s focal
attention on the actions of technologies in
working out the interplay of contending parties.
In this regard, ANT undercuts one of
three commonly unquestioned assumptions
that underpin much of our community’s
research: the categorical dichotomy between
human and non-human actors. In particular,
where an information system, as a non-human
actor, is granted a place to act within
heterogeneous networks according to the
interests inscribed within it, a clearer account
of both the technology’s design and the
technology’s effects can be gained. Thus,
while ANT is akin to other constructivist
approaches (broadly speaking), an ANT
analysis can more readily get beyond
regarding IT as mere “structure” that enables
and constrains. (For a comparison of ANT
and structuration theory in this vein, see
Hanseth, Aanestad, and Berg 2004.) This
points to a second assumption common to
implementation research that ANT helps undo:
The stepwise partitioning of technology design
from technology use (Hanseth, Aanestad, and
Berg 2004). In this regard, ANT transcends
such congenial perspectives as adaptive
structuration theory (e.g., DeSanctis and Poole
1994) in leading the researcher to consider not
just variations in user appropriation, but the
impact of use via feedback on the very heart of
technical design (Ramiller 2004). Finally, a
third assumption which ANT exposes is the
one associated with the use of a priori
sociological levels (e.g., individual, group,
organization). In its place, ANT focuses on
the identification of networks of actors, where
the networks themselves are seen to become
actors, as the scope of analysis widens. This
affords a flexible framework that makes the
“levels” in implementation research a matter
for empirical discovery rather than stipulation,
and that helps thereby to foster a greater
realism in capturing the action that takes place.
Notwithstanding the growing appeal of
ANT in scholarly inquiry, aspects of ANT can
readily strike some observers as highly
esoteric. Perhaps most foreign is ANT’s
elevation of technology to the status of an

actor on a par with intentional social actors.
This has been an important point of debate
among the anthropologists, sociologists, and
historians in science and technology studies
(STS), whose foundational work gave rise to
ANT. However, the idea of technology-asactor can also elicit discomfort and an
impression of exoticism in our more applied
field. The associated vocabulary (inscription,
interessement, black-boxing, and the like)
seems further to widen the gap that must be
bridged between an ANT analysis and what
we might hope to cast as useful guidance for
practicing professionals and managers.
Nevertheless, given ANT’s advantages
applied scholarship will benefit from efforts to
get beyond this surface impression of ANT as
abstruse and counter-intuitive. In pursuit of
that goal, this paper applies a selection of
concepts from ANT in an analysis of a major
systems project, and then uses the
organization’s experience as the basis for
drawing a number of practical implications
that suggest ways to apply ANT thinking in
other project contexts. The goal here is to be
helpful,
without
pretending
to
comprehensiveness. The project at hand,
being a “sample of one,” naturally provides the
opportunity only for selective insights (March,
Sproull, and Tamuz 1991). Even so, the
situation is a particularly rich and promising
one for inferring certain practical implications.
The organization in question is a notfor-profit human-services firm characterized
by a lagging position in IT investments and
experience.
Although the firm is a
technological laggard (Rogers 2003), the
objective here is not to draw a categorical
difference between lagging enterprises and the
relatively advanced firms that are more
commonly the subjects of study. Rather, the
intention is to exploit the firm’s relative
immaturity for its potential to set in sharp
relief certain issues of imminent practical
concern that hold across a broad range of
organizations. Brought especially into focus is
the centrality of learning in the creation and
play of interests in the project’s evolving actor
network.
The immature and emergent
character of the interests engaged invites a reexamination of what it really means to speak
of “interests” in ANT work. Also clearly
highlighted, because of the prominence of the
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firm’s regulative and normative institutional
context (Scott 1995), is the importance of
attending to scope and heterogeneity in the
practical application of ANT to the analysis of
interests.
Our
discussion
continues
by
considering selected ideas from ANT that are
useful in interpreting information-systems
projects like to one to be examined here. A
discussion of the case study then follows.
There we begin with some background on the
organization in question. The data-collection
approach is next briefly considered. ANT is
then applied in providing an account of the
developments in the case.
The paper
concludes by considering a number of
potential points of application, based on
observations from the case.

ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY AND THE
IDEA OF TRANSLATION
Actor-network theory (Walsham and
Sahay 1999: 42):
… examines the motivations and actions
of actors who form elements, linked by
associations, of heterogeneous networks
of aligned interests. A key feature of the
theory is that actors (or actants as they
are sometimes labeled) are taken to
include both human beings and nonhuman actors such as technological
artifacts. A major focus of the theory
when applied in particular contexts is to
try to trace and explain the process
whereby relatively stable networks of
aligned interests are created and
maintained, or alternatively to examine
why such networks fail to establish
themselves.
Successful networks of
aligned interests are created through the
enrollment of a sufficient body of allies
and the translation of their interests so
that they are willing to participate in
particular ways of thinking and acting
that maintain the network.
As this quotation suggests, the pivotal
concepts of translation and enrolment (Callon
and Latour 1981; Callon 1986) offer a crucial
focus for organizing and interpreting data in IT
projects such as the one investigated here. To
these we will add the idea of inscription,
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which is central to understanding how
technological artifacts, like information
systems, participate in actor networks.
Translation describes the overall
process by which a focal actor attempts to
align the interests of other actors with a
program or project which that focal actor is
championing.
“Translation”
suggests
establishing a linguistic equivalency among
interests. And indeed translation has been
defined as the “authority to speak… on behalf
of another actor” (Callon and Latour 1981).
Thus, “A translates B” means that A defines B
(Callon 1991).
Translation also suggests
movement, and some studies in actor-network
theory have accordingly used spatial
representations to represent the bringingtogether of interests around a project (e.g., see
Callon 1987: 206). This act of bringingtogether or making allies (see the quote above)
is a matter, first, of defining the equivalency of
interests and, second, of persuading the real
participants to act in accordance with the roles
into which they have been cast. This need for
persuasion means that rhetoric plays a key role
in translation (Walsham and Sahay 1999: 42).
The process of translation has further
been characterized as advancing through four
stages:
problematisation,
interessement,
enrolment, and mobilisation (Callon 1986).
Problematisation identifies and characterizes
the project and links it to the problems of the
other actors. At the same time, it positions the
principal actor as indispensable to the others.
Interessement is the process undertaken by the
principal actor to lock the other actors into the
roles that have been defined for them. If
successful, this is said to produce enrolment.
(We will speak about the “enrollment”
(admission) of clients in the case study.
Accordingly, to minimize ambiguity we will
use “enrolment” (with one “l”) for the ANT
concept.)
Mobilisation, then, arises from the fact
that enrolment is based on representation. The
outcome of enrolment is that selected
individuals are induced to speak as
representatives for a larger group; for example,
a lead user might speak for the needs of other
users in the organization, a selected portion of
code might speak for the reliability of an entire
application, and so on. The challenge in
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mobilizing an entire group is that those spoken
for may “betray” their representatives, dissent
from the program, and divert themselves away
from the project toward a contrary course of
action (or “anti-program”). Of course, the
representatives may themselves reverse
positions and defect.
With significant
dissidence, the network of heterogeneous
interests will fail to stabilize. Latour remarks
(1991: 127):
… a program’s capability to counter an
anti-program obviously depends on how
well an actor’s conception of others
corresponds to their conceptions of
themselves or of the said actor. If this
convergence is weak, the actor will
populate his world with other beings; but
these beings will behave in an
unpredictable fashion, attaching or
detaching themselves to the program from
version to version. If, on the other hand,
this convergence is strong, the actor can
begin to make predictions – or, in any
case, to guarantee the consistent
behaviour of the beings constituting his
world.
When the convergence Latour identifies
is strong, the actor network is said to move
toward a state of irreversibility (Callon 1991).
The commitments made by enroled parties, in
the form of
resources brought to their
engagement on behalf of a project, can be said
to become “black-boxed” (Klischewski 2002),
in that they are taken to be reliable and can
become the basis for enlisting further
commitments. Where technology design is an
issue in, or even the focus of, the project, the
design itself achieves irreversibility and takenfor-grantedness by degrees, in consonance
with the larger actor network.
It is readily apparent how these
concepts might be applied in creating an
account of an information systems project.
The analytical task would focus on identifying
the efforts of certain focal actors to translate
the diverse interests of other crucially
positioned parties into alignment with the main
thrust of the project’s goals, and the practical
moves they undertake to lock in the necessary
commitments. However, this framing, while
fine as far as it goes, is merely sociological
rather than properly socio-technical. An actor-

network account must also identify how the
technology itself acts with interest and force in
the project. Of frequent concern in ANT
analyses is how the technology may fail to
‘cooperate,’ whether as a function of
misunderstood physical properties or as the
result of a fatal immaturity. However, of
greater import in many systems projects is the
way in which the technology actually does
‘perform,’ so that it reflects the specific
interests inscribed in it by virtue of its design.
Inscription, then, is another key idea for
consideration when applying ANT to systems
projects (Monteiro 2000).
The particulars of an information
system’s design necessarily, if implicitly,
express a normative view of the future. It
reflects certain parties’ perceptions of how
things ought to be. As such, design is
invariably partial to the interests of some
actors and not others. However, inscription is
not merely a matter of one or another party’s
interests being reflected in and served by the
technology. As an actant in the organizational
setting, the system can in fact prescribe
patterns of action for others. An information
system, by its very design, involves
assumptions about the relationships that will
hold between the technology as artifact and the
people who will use it and whose work will be
affected by it. Thus, a “machine… tells or
prescribes the roles that it… expects other
elements in the network to play” (Klischewski
2002: 312).
Inscriptions may indeed constrain the
behavior of other participants in the actor
network. However, the notion of dissidence
suggests that inscriptions are not necessarily
utterly dictatorial. The technology’s users, in
particular, may deviate from the system’s
embedded prescriptions and adapt the system
to their own practices and preferences. More
broadly, where innovative technologies or
applications are involved, means-ends
relationships may be difficult to fully
anticipate, and so design choices may produce
unintended consequences in use. In this light,
the failure of the technology to perform
because of natural limitations or immaturity
appears as a special case of the potential
fragility of inscriptions. In ANT terms, in
defecting a technology reveals itself to be a
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problematic ground for the inscription of
interests.
Actor network theory has given rise to
a number of other concepts. For our purposes,
however, the core concepts of translation,
enrolment, and inscription, combined with an
appreciation for the potential for dissidence,
will serve as an effective point of departure in
analyzing the case. We consider background
information on the case next.

RESEARCH METHODS
The Field Study Site

dedicated to PC and LAN support. Managers
and clinical staff, by their own admission,
were “dinosaurs” in terms of their
understanding of information technology.
Meanwhile, pressures to limit administrative
expense had caused the firm to fall behind in
its IT investments. In a research interview, the
CEO conceded that the current project was
basically reactive to the pressures of the
“reimbursement climate,” suggesting that the
current project would likely not have
proceeded, despite a variety of motivations, if
North Bay were not under pressure from
outside entities to satisfy increasingly
demanding reporting requirements.

The organization, North Bay Services
(a pseudonym), is a not-for-profit firm that
provides an array of services for at-risk youth
and the developmentally disabled, including
counseling and psychiatric services, foster care,
group homes, on-campus residential facilities,
employment-placement support, and special
education. Its annual budget is approximately
$25 million dollars. The firm operates in a
changing environment, in which competition
for resources from similar firms is increasing
and new demands for accountability are being
imposed by external funding bodies and
oversight agencies. As a result, North Bay is
simultaneously under pressure both to operate
more efficiently and to provide documented
scientific evidence for the effectiveness of its
care and treatment programs. Achieving both
of these goals requires far better capabilities in
information capture, tracking, and utilization
than North Bay currently has in place.

The project was the organization’s third
attempt to build a core information system.
Two previous attempts had been abandoned,
the second after some two years had passed
and several hundred thousand dollars had been
spent. The new system was created using an
agile development strategy (Cockburn 2002;
Highsmith 2002), under the leadership of an
independent consultant, with implementation
directed by a small in-house project team, and
most programming work done by an outside
development firm. Up through the period
covered by the current study, two major
releases had been implemented and put into
active service, supporting referral, enrollment,
and tracking for clients in the residential and
day treatment programs, the management of
associated clinical records, and documentation
of special procedures.

Although “laggard” is a relative term,
the label nevertheless applies to North Bay by
several obvious measures. Prior to the project
that is the subject of the current study, only a
small percentage of the workforce, mainly
administrative and management personnel, had
used computers in their work. Beyond desktop
software for individual use, the only enterprise
applications in place were email, a basic
corporate financial package, human resources
software, and a package for tracking fundraising efforts.
No system functionality
existed in the core of the business, where the
tracking
of
patients
(‘clients’)
and
documentation of their treatment continued to
be handled by poorly integrated, incomplete,
and inaccurate paper-based processes. Internal
technical expertise was limited to a tiny staff

Data
collection
focused
on
conversations with the project leader, which
continued throughout the project, and
interviews with major participants, including
the system owner (the senior vice-president in
charge of the affected organizational units),
her primary reports, in-house project team
members, key users, and North Bay’s chief
executive. Detailed notes were taken during
the interviews; as soon as possible after each
interview, an extended write-up was developed
based on the notes.
The interview
conversations
were
supplemented
by
attendance at joint user-developer design
sessions
(these
were
tape-recorded),
observation of training sessions and system
demonstrations (recorded in notes), review of
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project documents (use cases, screen mockups,
screenflow diagrams, and the like), and study
of written communications (mainly email
messages).
Analysis of the diverse textual data that
resulted from these efforts proceeded on an
interpretive basis (Walsham 1993, 1995).
Multiple readings of the data were made, and
memos (Miles and Huberman 1984) were
developed during the process to capture the
higher-order generalizations that emerged.
This style of analysis entailed shifting in
hermeneutic fashion between the general and
the specific: Grasping how the overall pattern
presented by the case informed the
interpretation of particular elements alternated
with the consideration of how the elements
dictated revisions to the image of the whole
(Boland 1985). Data analysis commenced
while field activities were still underway, so
that insights gained from analysis could inform
the on-going data-collection efforts.
Actor network theory was adopted
early in the course of the study as a basic
interpretive framework. Hence, observation
and analysis came to be structured around the
identification of categories of actors, the
associated interests engaged, crucial events
and developments, and the actions taken by
participants. Of particular interest, relative to
actions, were efforts to affect project direction
and system design, and to shape others’
perceptions of the proper configuration, scope,
and goals of the system. Also, in light of the
concept of inscriptions, pains were taken to
identify ways in which system features
appeared to put pressure on the expectations
and conduct of human actors occupying
various roles in the organizational setting.
During the analysis, work was also
undertaken to identify a developmental
structure within which to create an account of
the project’s history. However, this involved
neither an appeal to an a priori sequence of
stages (e.g., the system development lifecycle),
nor the grounded creation of a phase structure
based on the facts of the case themselves. In
fact, this effort abstained altogether from
delimiting discrete phases in the project
timeline. Instead, the developmental structure
that came to be drawn was a more fluid and
imprecise one based on the emergence, growth,

and resolution of critical issues over the
course of the project. (This is consistent with
what Holmstrom and Robey (forthcoming)
have characterized as the “episodic character”
of actor translations in IT projects.)
What we will regard, here, as a critical
issue is a situation or set of events that
demands resolution in order for the project to
advance. As such, a critical issue sheds light
on the interplay of interests and exposes, in
one or more ways, the vulnerability and
potential reversibility of the project’s network
of support. Getting past a critical issue
invariably entails the translation of the
interests of particular actors whose
commitments are vital to its resolution.
Multiple critical issues can overlap in time,
and a critical issue might need to be addressed
more than once.
Defined in this way, a critical issue
corresponds closely to the concept of the
obligatory passage point in actor network
theory.
To use a spatial metaphor, an
obligatory passage point is a situation through
which the heterogeneous actors involved in a
project must be made to pass (Callon 1986).
This means that the actors must be convinced
that their interests are tied to the particular
resolution advanced by a focal or principal
actor (Callon 1986). In the course of such a
passage, accomplished through a cycle of
problematisation,
interessement,
and
enrolment, the focal actor is said to make
itself/himself/herself indispensable to these
other actors.
At North Bay, while the project as a
whole might itself be regarded as an
overarching obligatory passage point, the quest
for empirical concreteness calls our attention
to constituent situations, or ‘localized’
obligatory passage points, that emerged during
the course of the project. This, then, is where
the idea of critical issues comes in.
The emerging system itself was a focal
actor in regard to many of the critical issues,
because of the manner in which it implicitly
attributed particular interests and roles to the
other actors. This, once again, is the idea of
inscription.
For example, certain design
features relating to data collection entailed
changes to the work processes and cognitive
scripts of users; reporting capabilities carried
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implications for the information-usage
behavior of staff analysts and managers; and
organizational restructuring and businessprocess transformations induced by the new
system posed changes in leadership
responsibilities for managers.
Of course, for a system under
development these kinds of inscriptions are
only emergently material.
Prior to its
implementation, the form of North Bay’s
nascent system required representation by
other actors. The project leader, in particular,
spoke on behalf of the emerging system,
identifying and engaging the critical issues that
defined the system’s own sociotechnical
requirements, and attempting to draw about
the system, issue by issue, the necessary
network support. Thus, the representational
labor of the project leader brought this human
actor and the emerging system together as a
kind of hybrid focal actor (Hanseth, Aanestad,
and Berg 2004).
The project leader, then, naturally
became a focus of attention in data gathering
and analysis. Despite her status as an outside
consultant, she was the central representative
for the system, steadfastly speaking on its
behalf and authoring many of the translations
demanded by the project. The executive
system owner, by contrast, had a very distant
relationship to the details of the project and
essentially no involvement in design decisions,
and she interacted relatively little with other
project participants.
In this managerial
vacuum, the project leader’s scope of activity
evolved well beyond the nominal role of a
technical consultant “putting in a system”; she
increasingly became an organizational change
agent whose efforts embraced a range of
sociotechnical design initiatives.
Although the project leader was a focal
point in the study, in keeping with Latour’s
counsel to “compare the different versions
given by successive informants…” (Latour
1991: 127), careful attention was also given to
the problematisations posed by other
participants. These shed light on the practical
status of the project leader’s efforts in
translation. This provided, in some instances,
indications of potential dissidence that could
threaten to undo the network the project leader
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was struggling to build, and successively to
extend, on behalf of the emerging system.
In summary, the strategy for telling the
story of the North Bay project was based on
using ANT to identify and interpret the
emergent issues that had to be addressed in
order to maintain and extend the actor network
behind the new system. It was a matter, then,
of writing history based on successive
translations and the resulting enrolments (and
defections). As noted, this approach does not
produce a neatly segmented chronology:
Issues extend unequally over time, and can
appear and disappear only to reappear again.
Nevertheless, the following account entails a
temporal structure, in that it introduces the
issues in the order in which they came to
prominence during the history of the project.

THE NORTH BAY PROJECT: AN
ACTOR-NETWORK ACCOUNT
Figure 1 provides an overview of the
factoring of the project’s history into critical
issues. The figure is intended mainly for
orientation. The onset of any given critical
issue is difficult to pinpoint precisely, and its
ultimate resolution usually cannot be
established definitively. Accordingly, while
the figure establishes the relative position in
time when each critical issue surfaced, and the
lengths of the lines suggest durations, the
reality defies precise representation.
Dismantling a Legacy Network
A suitable place to begin the story is
with the arrival of the project leader. In a
fashion befitting the emergent causality
entailed in ANT analyses (Holmstrom and
Robey, forthcoming), the project leader did not
start out as the project leader, at all. Nor, in
fact, was there a project to lead, at this point in
time. Rather, the consultant who would
eventually become the project leader was hired
by the senior vice-president, on the basis of a
serendipitous connection, to spend two weeks
evaluating the second system effort (recall
North Bay’s history, described above), which
was then still underway. A great deal of
money had been spent at this point, most of it
going to a local contract development firm.
The functionality installed had fallen well
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dismantling the
legacy network
establishing the
project framework
making software,
making users
mobilizing, and
extending the design
maintaining the system,
maintaining the network
time

Figure 1. Project History by Critical Issues
short of expectations, users found the system
difficult to use, and communication problems
between the users and the contractor had
reached the point where further progress
seemed unlikely. After a brief period of time
during which the consultant and senior vicepresident explored possibilities for salvaging
the existing project, it was decided to abandon
it.
ANT investigations of systems projects
typically do not remark on the need to clear
out actor networks associated with prior
activities. But everyday observation suggests
that the persistence of old network elements
can impede the initiation and conduct of a new
project. The challenge here is more than a
matter of cancelling contracts, dealing with
legal issues, reassigning internal staff, and the
like. It also involves changing people’s
expectations and undoing their enrolments in
the abandoned effort. It can also mean dealing
with a kind of legacy of dissidence: Those
whose enrolment in the earlier project was
problematic may be predisposed, based on
their negative experience, to resist enrolment
in the new project on the basis of a cynical,
“Here we go again.”
North Bay’s failures in two earlier
projects, and particularly the costly and
frustrating experience in the second effort,
would ensure that the challenge of dismantling
the legacy network would persist as a critical

issue for a considerable period of time.
According to several informants, of greatest
importance in helping participants break
cognitively with past experience was the
manner in which the in-house project team
interacted with the users. In following an agile
development approach, which involved
frequent and intensive communication around
focused issues of work process and system
design, the team offered a distinct contrast to
the previous system-development regime. In
that earlier project, interaction was sequestered
in occasional requirements meetings driven
largely by the contractors; otherwise the
development group had little on-site presence.
The technology itself also played a role
in putting distance between the new project
and its predecessors.
As pieces of
functionality began to be rolled out, the new
system introduced itself to its future users
through a significantly superior and friendlier
interface design (thanks in great part to the
design skill of the contract development firm).
The technology, as actant, thereby won
adherents among the reluctant well in advance
of its large-scale implementation.
Establishing the Project Framework
A collection of basic decisions set the
initial course for the new project, determining
much about how it would be developed, who
would play what roles in the development
process, and what the scope of the new system
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would be. All three concerns would help to
determine whose interests would be, and had
to be, engaged. This period of decisionmaking should not be construed as a planning
exercise; to the contrary, it clearly represented
an
extended
improvisational
exercise
involving a succession of interdependent
selections and exclusions concerning the basic
“how,” “who,” and “what” of the project.
The project’s How. One basic issue
had to do with choosing between a package
solution and a custom-development strategy.
The core problematization, in this case, came
to focus on the ability of the available
packages both to support the diverse services
of the organization (rather broad for a firm of
its type) and to deliver those services, over
time, across a geographically dispersed
organization involving multiple facilities.
Given this geographic challenge, a Web-based
solution came to be regarded as a requirement.
Vertical package options were, one by one,
evaluated and rejected, and the firm came to
settle once again on a custom-development
strategy. Here, North Bay relied heavily on
the opinion of the consultant. It seems
apparent that North Bay’s executives and
board fell short of fully grasping the technical
reasoning behind this position. What they did
understand, in the circumstances, was that the
consultant would exit under a package
scenario (she had made this clear), to be
replaced by experts in implementing the
package chosen. Significant trust had already
been established in the consultant, and
management was uncomfortable proceeding
further without her guidance.
Trust,
accordingly, substituted to a substantial degree
for management knowledge and judgment in
the IT domain, and foreshadowed the
emergence of the consultant as the focal actor
in the situation.
The decision to take an agile
development approach, also an aspect of the
project’s basic “how,” followed the choice of
the custom-development path. The consultant,
in fact, first offered management a more
structured vision of how the project should be
conducted. However, after a short time the
users’ and managers’ lack of prior
participation in systems projects, combined
with their inexperience in using information
technology, made it clear that a more
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evolutionary approach would be needed. The
development team improvised the use of visual
use cases (a blend of screen mock-ups and use
cases) to facilitate user participation in the
early stages of system-component design;
these were followed as quickly as possible by
the introduction of working pieces of software,
which selected users could work with and
provide feedback on. This design cycle was
pursued relentlessly as more and more
functionality was rolled out to the organization.
In this manner, users were enlisted to work
closely with the development team throughout
the project.
As noted, a Web-based architecture
emerged as another founding premise in the
project. Microsoft’s .Net technology was
chosen at the recommendation of the
development firm (see below) as the basic
platform for developing the new system. In a
system project, components of the enabling
technology are themselves actants that must be
enroled and made to behave as required. Of
course, because of immaturity, poor fit, or
fundamental physical limitations they do not
always do so, and this can threaten the stability
of the project’s actor network. Here, the
bleeding-edge choice of.Net seemed to present
a textbook case of risk. Nevertheless, it
proved unproblematic. The organization could
not be so sanguine about its own computing
and network infrastructure. For an extended
period of time, it seemed uncertain that the
network administrator (see below) would
respond with a program of adequate upgrades
to support the new system. This issue lingered
for nearly a year, until it was eventually
resolved with the replacement of this
individual.
The project’s Who.
Once the
consultant had shepherded the organization
over its break with the previous project, and
management had once again advanced down
the path of custom development, the
consultant outlined a preliminary project-team
structure in which the senior vice-president
would play the role of system owner, and the
network administrator (this was before he was
fired) would be the project manager. The
consultant would stay on as system/business
analyst and help with requirements
determination and system design. A staff
person with medical-records training and a
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broad knowledge of the organization would
join the project team as a kind of cross
between lead user and analyst. A startup firm,
comprised of individuals who had worked for
a package vendor in the industry, would do
most of the programming. Their development
work would be supplemented by a new hire at
North Bay, a recently graduated informationsystems major, whose main focus would be on
database design and development.
As was true for the bleeding-edge
technology, the initial composition of this core
project team appeared to pose high risk.
Although the individuals in the outside
development firm brought considerable
experience to the table, the firm per se was
brand new, and it was accordingly unclear
what kind of process difficulties this might
cause between the two firms. The junior
internal staff (the lead user/analyst and
database programmer) had next to no project
experience. The network administrator had
never managed a software project, and the
senior executive had never sponsored such a
project. While this initial actor network could
accordingly be expected to be highly fragile,
only the network administrator failed to rise to
the new role into which he had been cast.
Falling far short in basic knowledge,
organizational abilities, motivation, and
communication skills, he was discharged from
the project leader role in fairly short order.
The consultant (reluctantly) took over as
project manager at the behest of the executive
sponsor. This far from eliminated the risk at
this “node” in the actor network:
The
consultant, despite having many years of
software-related experience in diverse roles
and industries, had actually never managed a
software project.
Besides essential aptitudes and basic
knowledge, what appeared to give this
unlikely collection of actors the potential to
cohere as a stable network core was a high
level of communication and trust.
This
permitted the actors to find an alignment of
interests, where each party’s prospective
gains – in employment, career enrichment,
firm success, solutions to management
problems, and so on – were effectively equated
with the advancement of the project. Of
course, this translation of interests was not
instantly realized. Instead, it represented an

emergent property, worked out and proven in
the process of working together on the early
tasks of the project.
The new system’s prospective users, of
course, also represented an important “who” in
the project. However, they are best viewed as
bringing a separate set of critical issues to the
project, ones coming to prominence once the
work on requirements definition and system
design began in earnest. In this process, the
precise “who” of relevance were discovered
and enrolled as actors over a period of time, as
the system’s functionality grew and its
organizational scope of applicability became
clearer. We will visit the users, accordingly,
in the next section.
The how and the who, of course, were
interdependent. Much as the who depended on
the how – note that the hiring of the outside
firm depended on the choice of a custom
development path – the how also depended on
the who. It was the project leader’s trust in the
technical leadership at the outside firm, for
example, that made the seemingly risky choice
of .Net reasonable. In some instances, the
direction of causality remained unclear. For
instance, did the retention of the consultant
depend on the decision to pursue custom
development, or was custom development
chosen in order to retain the consultant?
The project’s What. Relative to the
issue of what, our interest at this point is in the
broad scope of what the system would be
designed to do. The specific features and
capabilities of the system were a matter to be
worked out, in detail, in downstream project
activities. However, as part of the initial
project framing there was the more basic
question of what services within the firm the
system should support.
As work began in earnest, the executive
sponsor announced her priorities to the project
leader, and situated enrollment and tracking of
clients at the center of the firm’s information
management needs. Of course, organizational
needs, however well-reasoned, do not tell the
entire tale: It must be possible to extend the
project’s actor network in ways required to
support the associated software-development
work. In this case, even though the executive
sponsor had specifically identified enrollment
in the foster care unit as a high priority, the
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evasiveness of that unit’s director made
extending the project’s actor network into that
area highly improbable. In particular, her
engagement and the participation of her
subordinates would clearly be inadequate to
produce a sound and useful design. The
project leader subsequently steered the
development work, with the executive
sponsor’s tacit consent, around the foster-care
services unit. (The unit remains, today, largely
unsupported by the system.)
Here, the what and the who clearly
interacted. The scope of the system, as laid
out by management, appeared to dictate who
had to be brought into the actor network. But
that scope proved, in practice, to be more
negotiable than might otherwise have been
envisioned. The requirements of the actor
network, and limitations in the organization’s
ability to satisfy them, in the end affected the
constitution of the system. How the system
would actually work, what it would actually do,
and where it would actually serve took shape
in response to how soft spots and obstacles in
the existing fabric of the organization defined
the possibilities (and impossibilities) for
extending the project’s actor network.
ANT analyses often treat the
technology as an actor once it has been built
(its inscriptions put into place) and
implemented, and can then begin to affect
materially the activities of the human actors.
Now, in a systems project based on agile
development that moment of material
engagement comes sooner than in traditional
“structured” projects, as working pieces of
software begin to be put into the users’ hands
at an early point. However, it was clear in the
current project that even as a concept, the new
system became an entity invested with a
measure of power. Rather like a magnet
beneath a piece of paper strewn with iron
filings, the mere idea of the system generated a
kind of socio-cognitive field, with the
capability of compelling attention and
diverting cognitive resources within the firm.
The developing discourse about the system
began to affect expectations and beliefs within
the firm, even before the system itself had
begun to exist as a material artifact (Ramiller
2001). The range within which the system, as
such a discourse object, could make its effects
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felt, corresponded closely to the expanding
actor network for the project.
That network expanded outward from
the core project team to take in larger portions
of the organization, as users were brought in to
engage in conversations with the core project
team about the emerging material features of
the system and their eventual use in the work
processes of the firm.
The particular
challenges involved in network construction
changed in certain ways, as this new
population was engaged. This phenomenon is
examined in our next section.
Making Software, Making Users
User engagement in requirements
definition and system design – note that in
agile development regimes, the on-going
adaptation of the system based on users’
continual feedback makes it impossible to
draw a clear distinction between the two –
essentially began with the inclusion of the
medical records professional as a business
analyst in the core project team (see above).
Her knowledge of the organization, its
procedures, and the information requirements
of outside agencies provided much of the basis
for the earliest efforts in data, application, and
interface design. Nevertheless, the circle of
engagement progressively expanded to include
other prospective system users whose
specialized knowledge was needed in the
project. Of particular importance, at this stage,
were the administrative personnel, clinical
staff, and unit supervisors involved in frontline data capture where the enrollment,
tracking, and treatment of the clients took
place. Selected individuals in these roles were
enlisted to review and revise visual use cases
and, subsequently, the working pieces of the
system.
In this manner, user engagement in
system design took on a two-tier character, in
which a lead user with a more general view of
the organization was involved broadly in the
effort and others were brought in to address
selected issues. Over time, the role of lead
user shifted from the business analyst to an
employee of long tenure in the organization
who held the curiously inadequate title of
“medical transcriptionist.” While she did
indeed transcribe doctors’ dictation for
inclusion in client records, the original role
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reflected in her title had placed her in a
position where a variety of client-related
documents routinely passed over her desk. As
a result, her actual work had long since
informally
(although
never
officially)
expanded
to
encompass
data-quality
monitoring and enforcement. She became a
primary user of the new system, as sufficient
system functionality came on line, and the
project leader sought her out on a regular basis,
as efforts continued to refine and extend the
system’s functionality.
This period in the project witnessed the
first significant business-side commitments to
the system – beyond, of course, the project
approval and funding granted by the senior
management and board. Most significantly,
business knowledge was now being committed
in a sufficiently concrete way to begin shaping
the design of the system. On the other hand,
the participants’ inexperience with information
technology and information-systems projects
proved problematic. Many prospective users
lacked the pertinent cognitive frames to
support effective participation.
ANT studies commonly treat interests
as unproblematic in themselves, and
straightaway ask how interests do or do not
become aligned (Walsham and Sahay 1999),
and how commitments do or do not get made
(Klischewski 2002). But North Bay, in its
laggard status, brought into sharp relief the
fact that sometimes a project must entertain
the constitution of interests. The task of
translation depends upon a certain level of
subject competence that may not yet exist,
especially in circumstances where actors lack
the knowledge even to understand why and
how and when to enrol (or dissent).
This possibility adds an important
dimension to the concept of translation. In
order to get actors “to participate in particular
ways of thinking and acting that maintain the
network” (Walsham and Sahay 1999:42), their
interests may need to be constituted through
the very processes of translation by which
their enrolment is sought.
Learning
accordingly can be seen as an integral part of
the process of actor engagement.
This,
obviously, also expands our view of the
responsibilities of the focal actor in the North
Bay project, who had to create a minimum

threshold of business-side capability for
thinking
about
IT
and
information
management in the firm.
Part of the project leader’s challenge
was getting user-participants to recognize the
basic contestability of the system’s design,
their own potential for influencing it, and the
inherent limits in the technical team’s
knowledge and authority.
The restricted
participation afforded users in the previous
system project made this challenge even more
pronounced, because of the expectations that it
helped to create. In response, the project
leader fostered user engagement through
measures expressly crafted to give users a
large voice in the design proceedings. Design
sessions focused on users’ own narratives
concerning work, in the context of hands-on
engagement with visual use cases and working
software.
Problematisation, interessement,
and enrolment were thereby accomplished, in
a concrete way, by bringing relevant
functional elements of the system directly and
tangibly into the users’ work activities.
Users were also encouraged to engage
in creating representations of how the new
system might affect, and be affected by, the
larger organizational context. Thus, their
engagement was not simply a matter of
reflecting on the new system’s features relative
to immediate work tasks and business
processes. This led the users, in turn, to
consider the potential implications of system
features for other interests not directly engaged
in the design process.
For example,
participants reflected on the information
demands of funding agencies, the requirements
of outside review agencies (like the Joint
Commission for the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations, or JCAHO), and the
needs of family interests.
They also
commented on the requirements of other
parties within the organization (e.g., “What Dr.
X wants to see, at this point in the process, is
Y.”). In this manner, the participants learned
to position themselves as representatives of
interests that had no direct voice in the design
process at the given point in time. This
effectively served to expand the actor network
in a virtual sense, and to foreshadow lines of
network extension during the system’s
subsequent large-scale implementation.
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In summary, during this phase the
project in effect created its own users, even as
the system itself was being built. Each of
these “construction” efforts helped to provide
the context for the other. In a sense, however,
all of this work was prelude. Design would
begin with a vengeance with the rollout of the
system to the wider organization. That brings
us to the next critical issue in the project.
Mobilization, and Extending the Design
Analyzing implementation from an
ANT perspective involves attention to shifts in
the representational activities of the actors in
the network. Representation, as noted a
moment ago, is a defining aspect of the period
during which major specification and
construction take place. For example, users
involved in requirements definition and
interface design speak for the needs of other
individuals within the firm, and for the
interests of their units and, where relevant,
their clients.
Executive sponsors and
participating managers speak on behalf of
employees and other managers, and for the
organization, its larger goals, and its
stakeholders’ interests. The project leader
speaks for the organizational fit and value of
the future system. Technical personnel speak
for the capabilities and requirements of the
infrastructure that will have to support the
operation of the new system. Components of
the emerging system speak for the
performance of what will, at some point,
become the full production system. Initial
data-loads speak to the quality of the
operational data that will eventually populate
the database.
While, narrowly speaking, the actor
network comprises the actants that are actually
engaged in and making commitments to the
project, there also exists a kind of virtual
network that embraces a much larger
population of actants spoken for but not (yet)
speaking on their own behalf. Figure 2
illustrates this phenomenon for the North Bay
project, based on statements made by
participants in interviews, meetings, and
written communiques. (The figure does not
attempt
to
address
the
substantial
representational work that occurred where
actors at North Bay spoke on behalf of other
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actors who were also within the boundaries of
the actor network. Were it to do so, the figure
would show the project leader, in particular, at
the center of a dense web of internal
representations.)
Again, as Latour also points out,
although an actor “may populate his world
with other beings,” it remains to be seen “how
well [the] actor’s conception of others
corresponds to their conceptions of
themselves”; the result may be that those
whom the actor claims to represent may
“behave in an unpredictable fashion, attaching
or detaching themselves to the program from
version to version” (Latour 1991: 127). In a
systems development project, it is at the point
where large-scale implementation takes place
that many elements in the realm of the spokenfor now must be mobilized and moved from
the virtual into the real actor network.
Limitations inherent in the activity of
representation mean that expanding the real
actor network can be far from unproblematic;
dissidence and defections, in fact, are likely.
Figure 3 suggests the shift in scope of
the actor network at North Bay, under the
mobilization brought about by the large-scale
rollout of the system. A number of categories
of actors that previously were without direct
voice in the project now entered the actor
network. (For readability, the lines depicting
representation that appear in Figure 2 have
been removed.) Mobilization does not imply
that acts of representation now ceased. To the
contrary, representational activity expanded
and increased in intensity in certain areas,
especially where the growing complexity of
interests directly engaged within the actor
network
fostered
increased
conflict.
Nevertheless, as more actors began to speak
for themselves through direct participation, the
boundary beyond which representational work
generated the world of virtual actors got
pushed farther out.
A key aspect of this representational
shift is that the system became a more
complete and far more pervasive actor. While
the earlier period focusing on software
construction had involved a steady increase in
user enrolments in the actor network, with fullscale implementation the project witnessed a
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discontinuous jump in the numbers and variety
of organizational actors who directly
encountered the system. These included users
not previously involved in the design effort,
managers only nominally engaged before, and
technical personnel with infrastructure
responsibilities who would now be placed
under significant new demands. In short, the
bringing of new actors within the sphere of the
project’s actor network was to a substantial
degree occasioned by the shift of the systemin-development to a production system.
The consequences of such a significant
expansion in a project’s actor network are
complex and difficult to predict. It is prudent,
however, to anticipate significant dissidence,
threats to the stability of the network and even,
potentially, the rejection of the new system.
At North Bay, a great many new enrolments
had to be sought, which engaged the project
leader and other system champions in
extended efforts to convince other actors that
their interests were in alignment with the
inscriptions entailed in the new system.
This
convincing
expanded
the
organization’s learning in two major ways.
First, it entailed a collective effort to determine
how roles and responsibilities ought to be
changed in light of the new system. These
changes could not be planned in advance, but
had to involve the organization in a process of
discovery and sensemaking (Weick 1995) that
could fully commence only upon direct
engagement with the production system.
Second, individuals and units within the
organization had to develop the knowledge
and skills demanded by their new or
transformed roles.
Clinical staff and administrative
employees had to come to understand, and to
accept, what the system expected them to do,
especially in the area of data capture. Analysts
and managers, as information consumers, had
to learn what the new reporting capabilities
might entail for their work. Managers, in their
role as agents of control, had to grasp their
responsibilities
for
restructuring
and
incentivizing changes in users’ behavior; they
also had to learn how the new level of
information generated by the system might
affect the visibility of organizational practices
to outside parties.
Members of the IT
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organization had to learn what demands the
system and its users would place on the IT
infrastructure and support services.
While the new system thereby placed a
variety of demands on the human actors, in
such a situation the latter do not necessarily
comply passively with the dictates of the
system. Even as their own work and conduct
are under pressure to change, users and
managers may in various ways act against the
system. This was clearly witnessed at North
Bay in the early stages of implementation.
Relative to data capture, for example, some
administrative and clinical personnel balked at
providing certain data stipulated by the
system’s screens. The consequences of this
behavior for data quality posed an obvious
threat to the system’s long-term viability,
because of the potential loss of support for the
system from other actors dependent on this
data. Beyond such passive resistance, users
also acted directly against the system by
proposing a variety of changes to its design, in
an attempt to accomplish shifts in what data
would be captured, when it would be captured,
and by whom.
In the discussion to follow, we will take
a closer look at the mobilization of three main
interests in North Bay’s implementation
effort – the clinical and administrative staff,
the managers, and the technical support unit.
In keeping with an ANT perspective, we
consider both how the new system impacted
the expanding network of human actors, and
how the human actors responded with their
own moves to reshape the technology.
Mobilizing the users. In the early
months of regular system use, a number of
data-quality problems began to appear. In
some cases, clinical and administrative staff
were not entering data the system was
designed to capture. In other cases, erroneous
data were being submitted. Some records
were not being “closed” as required by formal
procedures. Other records were not being
properly “signed off” by supervisors. While
insufficient training in system-related work
processes could be faulted for some of the
trouble, it was apparent that the issue ran
deeper than this. Users were in many cases
balking at entering the data the system was
designed to expect.
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For example, administrative personnel
doing enrollment processing (client intake)
were found to be systematically leaving certain
data-entry fields blank.
This gap was
discovered by the staff analyst in charge of
performance quality assessment, who required
the information for certain reports he needed
to produce for outside agencies. A process of
negotiation ensued, adjudicated by the project
leader, in which issues of responsibilities,
work-process change, and system design all
entered into the mix. The staff analyst lobbied
heavily for making the fields in question
required – in effect, a call for building new
inscriptions into the technology that would
dictate the behavior of the intake personnel.
The intake personnel counter-argued that the
information needed was not available at the
point in time when enrollment took place.
Analysis of the work process revealed that this
claim was partially factual – timing was
indeed an issue for certain pieces of data. On
the other hand, the intake staff could obtain
some of the needed information with extra
effort. The resolution, then, turned on getting
accommodations out of the intake personnel,
combined with a restructuring of the work
process and associated screen re-designs. It
also entailed changing the staff analyst’s
expectations about when he could expect to
get the information he needed.
Problems also surfaced among the
clinical staff. One crucial area of system
functionality was the recording of “special
procedures,” physical measures taken to
intervene with clients whose behavior posed
an immediate threat of harm to themselves or
others. As clinical staff engaged this feature
of the system, a variety of difficulties appeared.
Some records were only partially completed;
others included questionable or erroneous
classifications of client behaviors; in some
cases, multiple records were created for the
same incident; many records were not formally
closed and forwarded to supervisory personnel
for review and signoff; and supervisors were
often giving records inadequate review. Even
more seriously, the data that were being
captured by this system feature appeared to
expose the excessive use of special procedures,
at odds with organizational policies and
external licensing standards.

A great deal was at stake in this issue,
because for firms like North Bay special
procedures come in for particular scrutiny
from outside agencies. The gravity of the
matter brought a variety of supervisory,
managerial, and executive personnel into
discussions of possible changes in staff
training, work procedures, and system design.
The issue became intensely rhetorical (Latour
1987), as participants invoked a variety of
other interests that had no direct voice in the
current discourse (again, see Figure 2a). Thus,
the interests of clients, the clinical staff (whose
own safety was an issue), and accreditation
bodies came to be represented in the
discussions.
Overlapping and conflicting
objectives were also advanced as having a
legitimate bearing on the system’s inscriptions,
including
social
control,
regulatory
compliance, adherence to professional
standards, and retention of staff. Although a
redesign of the data-capture screens for special
procedures was settled on, it remained
doubtful (at the time fieldwork concluded for
the present study) that a definitive resolution
had actually been reached.
Other problems with information
capture in the residential and treatment units
spoke to a failure to enrol clinical staff in new
and essential roles in information management.
Clinical personnel were the only ones able to
record certain data at the point where the data
were generated – specifically, in their work
with the clients.
However, occupational
identity presented a significant barrier to
getting these actors to see front-line data entry
as aligned with their interests. As a number of
managers observed during interviews, staff in
the units viewed client care as their primary
professional responsibility. By contrast, they
saw the information-generation aspects of their
work as secondary (if not completely
expendable) and “clerical.”
In summary, the mobilization of users
for essential data-capture activities raised a
series of challenges in sociotechnical design,
demanding creative and adaptive efforts in
restructuring work roles and procedures,
enroling staff, and re-designing system
features. This process was continuing at the
point where the fieldwork for this study
concluded, and in some cases successful
resolutions to the emerging problems were
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even then not clearly in hand. Particularly
serious was the persistent ambivalence of staff
toward the information-management duties the
system implicitly enlisted them in.
In interviews, managers equivocated on
the question of getting their staff to take up
these duties. Some managers even suggested
that, notwithstanding the organizational
importance of the new system, the matter of
professional identity presented an intractable
barrier. The managers’ own ambivalence on
this matter, then, suggested that mobilizing
management was also problematic. We turn to
this issue next.

organizational structures, work process
designs, job definitions, employee knowledge,
and incentive schemes. In conjunction with
recognizing the sociotechnical scope of the
new “system,” management also needed to
learn how to draw the logical implications for
its own responsibilities in change leadership.
These lessons, however, were difficult to learn.
A common impulse was to put the onus for
outcomes
back
on
the
technology.
Emblematic of this naïvete was the statement
of one manager: “We have a half- million
dollar system now. Why can’t it do what I
want?”

Mobilization threatened to founder on
three pervasive characteristics of the
management group at North Bay – its
immaturity in IT matters, a predilection for
disengagement from operational specifics, and
an ambivalence toward the information the
new system would provide.

Overcoming this immaturity in thinking
about “systems” was hampered by a
managerial predilection toward disengagement
in operational details. A vicious circle was
thereby set in motion, where disengagement
meant abdicating opportunities to gain
knowledge about the new system, and lack of
knowledge in turn further discouraged
engagement.
A rather extreme form of
delegation ensued, in which crucial knowledge
about the complex interactions between the
system and the organization pooled with
individuals apart from the firm’s management.
These included, notably, the project leader
who (as a consultant) was expected to exit the
firm in the not-too-distant future, plus her
young team members, who would likely seek
greener pastures based on their experience
with the project. Thus, even as business-side
knowledge built up in the system’s actor
network, it threatened just as quickly to leak
away. Crucial knowledge also pooled with the
lead user (the mis-named “medical
transcriptionist”), whose tenure was more
stable than these other actors, but who neither
had, nor particularly wanted, the ear of
management.

Relative to immaturity, North Bay’s
managers shared with the staff a lack of
experience in the development and use of
information systems.
Learning was
accordingly of the essence in mobilizing
management.
Of particular import was
management’s need to learn that the new
system was not just the technology involved.
To the contrary, the true “system” – the
investment that would move the organization
ahead in information management – comprised
the technology in concert with appropriate

Compounding
the
problem
of
managerial disengagement was the fact that
the prevalent culture of decision making at
North Bay entailed a diffuse, consensus-based
approach, in which the responsibility for
implementing decisions and doing follow-up
was often poorly specified. This made it
difficult to clearly establish the commitments
of individual managers.
The resulting
elusiveness in accountability made it relatively
easy for managers to reverse prior
commitments.

Mobilizing management. As staff
directly encountered the new system, it
became increasingly clear that management
too had to become more deeply engaged. The
system put managers under pressure to make
their own kinds of commitments, especially in
regard to how they would manage their
subordinates’ behavior within the work
processes being transformed by the new
system.
Where
managers
invoked
“professional identity” to excuse employees
from attending properly to data-capture tasks,
they tacitly validated user defections from the
actor network. The long-term implications
were potentially grave: A sufficient number of
such defections could perpetuate a pattern of
failure in information management that would
eventually lead to an utter loss of confidence
in the system.
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The endemic disengagement appeared
to be exacerbated by ambivalence concerning
the larger movement in the industry toward
enhanced
information
management.
Management simultaneously did and did not
want some of the data the new system could
potentially provide. While organizationalperformance measurements – to the extent
they are valid, an issue raised in interviews by
the firm’s own clinically trained managers –
might promise to support improved practice,
they also threatened increased exposure. As
the comments of management informants
suggested, poor organizational performance
was not the only concern. Negative outcome
measurements might also foster doubts about
the viability of the disciplinary practices in
social work and human services on which the
enterprise’s core legitimacy was founded.
Were its clinical practitioners indeed
scientifically-grounded
professionals
or
something closer to prison wardens?
When it came to the challenge of
mobilizing managers at North Bay, then,
immaturity, disengagement, and ambivalence
made it difficult for the project leader and her
core team to gauge managers’ interests, to
predict their behavior, and to rely on their
commitments. Randomness and disorder in
the project’s actor network accordingly
increased as the project moved forward into
large-scale implementation. The behavior of
the director who supervised the majority of the
units affected by the early system releases
typified the challenge. In addition to an
unwillingness to engage his subordinates on
the issue of data-entry responsibilities, he
made comments well into the project to the
effect that North Bay “should have gone with a
package.”
Mobilizing technical support. As
Figure 2b (above) suggests, implementation
also entailed bringing within the project’s
actor network the IT infrastructure necessary
to run the new system on a production basis in
the firm. This required new investments in
server and network capacity, plus operating
system upgrades. It also meant mobilizing
North Bay’s small technical support staff on
behalf of the system. As noted earlier, North
Bay’s network administrator had started out as
the project manager but had quickly failed at
the job; his subsequent recalcitrant behavior

then raised concerns about the proper
preparation of the infrastructure. Doubts over
the network administrator’s enrolment were
rendered moot, however, when the CEO
decided to hire a CIO, on the independent
recommendation of two outside consultants.
While it seems likely that the move to
hire a CIO was due in part to the boost the new
system gave to the salience of information
technology, the effect was fraught with irony
for the project itself. Although the new CIO
fired the problematic network administrator,
his own behavior soon raised fresh concerns.
Inside of his first few days at the firm, the CIO
began stating to people on the business side
that he “would have done a package” instead.
Meanwhile, to junior members of the core
project team, then in the midst of training and
other intensive user-support activities, he
announced that “it was time to pull away from
the users,” in order to get started on other
activities he had in mind. In short, the CIO
made it clear that he did not view his own
interests as aligned with those of the new
system; in fact, he appeared eager to
encourage others to defect from the project’s
actor network. A prickly relationship at once
ensued between the CIO, on the one hand, and
the project leader and the system’s executive
sponsor, on the other. The threat that the IT
infrastructure would not be enlisted in support
of the system accordingly persisted. It also
remained to be seen how the CIO might
influence the CEO, or how he might affect the
views of mid-level managers whose support
was necessary to get compliance from the
users.
The situation was eventually resolved
with the escalation of the conflict to the CEO.
The CEO affirmed his enrolment in the actor
network by separating the new CIO from any
authority over the system project, while
making infrastructural support for the system
the CIO’s highest priority. The translation of
the CIO’s interests was more fully
accomplished, some months later, when the
tenure of the project leader ended (due to
budget constraints), and accountability for the
system was formally transferred to the CIO.
Beyond the obvious importance of
making the infrastructure and the people who
build and support it allies in a systems project,
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the tale of the new CIO also illustrates the
hazards that random introductions potentially
pose to an actor network. A new actor who by
virtue of formal position holds power and
influence not only represents a potential point
of dissidence, but may also inspire or actively
foster the defection of others and, hence,
destabilize the actor network .
Postscript:
Re-designing
as
institutionalization. In a project based on the
classical systems development lifecycle,
significant changes to the user interface,
application logic, and database are resisted, on
principle, during rollout and implementation.
Of course, many such projects witness these
kinds of changes anyway, because of the
problems with fully specifying requirements
before users actually have the system to work
with (Highsmith 2002). At North Bay, by
contrast, the agile development strategy made
on-going system design an integral part of the
implementation activity.
As noted here,
organizational members took advantage of this
regime by proposing various changes to the
system, in response to mobilization crises that
exposed problems in sociotechnical adjustment
between work practices and workers, on the
one hand, and the system, on the other.
Some of the proposed changes had the
potential
to
diminish
the
system’s
organizational role – producing, in effect,
localized de-inscriptions that would reduce its
power to determine other actors’ behavior.
However, at another level the very activity
surrounding these proposals was indicative of
a solidification in the system’s actor network.
Efforts to re-design elements of the system
helped to earn it a taken-for-granted status
among the human actors involved, because
they amplified people’s engagement with the
system and increased their level of
commitment to it. Re-design hence became a
form of symbolic validation, and helped to
institutionalize the system.
Maintaining the system, maintaining the
network
The final critical issue (refer again to
Figure 1) is an incipient one, in that it had
become apparent only as the field study was
being concluded. Nevertheless, it provides a
good place to wrap up our story of the North
Bay project.
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The project leader departed North Bay
at the end of 2003. The departure would prove,
in fact, to be a hiatus, and the project leader is
(at the time of this writing) back at the firm on
a part-time basis. In her absence, various data
quality issues continued to arise, signaling the
need for on-going design refinements,
detection and diagnosis of accumulating errors,
and changes in work processes. The firm’s
difficulties in actually addressing these
problems spoke to the continuing inattention
of the managers to the larger informationmanagement challenges in the firm, as well as
to problems in developing effective changemanagement processes between the IT group
and the business and clinical side of the
organization.
In short, the exit of the project leader
from the actor network appeared to hamper
further advancement in the system. This
points to the potential perturbation that critical
departures, like the random introductions
noted above, can cause to a project’s network.
More broadly, it calls attention to the fact that
system maintenance depends on the parallel
maintenance of a viable, heterogeneous actor
network, much like the kind that is required in
development and implementation. At the
conclusion of this study, it was not yet clear
whether executives at North Bay, including the
CEO and CIO, fully grasped the need to make
the requisite investments in the actor network,
including hires in key roles that would
continue in championship of the system.
Conflicting priorities, including potentially
attractive and symbolically visible new system
initiatives, combined with persistent notions
that the original system was basically
“finished,” raised doubts about whether
adequate support would be forthcoming for the
now-established system.

DISCUSSION: ACTOR NETWORKS AND
THE PRACTICE OF PROJECT
LEADERSHIP
The goal of this discussion section is to
draw some implications from the North Bay
study regarding the broader application of
actor-network theory to the practical
management of systems projects. (On this
theme, see also Atkinson 2000, Klischewski
2002, and Underwood 2001.)
While
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generalization is the objective, this is
obviously not a matter of statistical
generalization. Actor-network analyses do not
aspire to variance models based on predictor
variables and decontextualized statements of
the form “more X will produce more Y.”
Rather, ANT necessarily entails a processoriented view (Markus and Robey 1988). In
that regard, it is important to acknowledge that
we are dealing with a single case, and
therefore broad claims concerning patterns of
process are out of bounds. The goal here is
more modest. Using ANT as a lens, we
simply want to examine the case for insights
into the kinds of things management should be
alert for, in any complex project involving
multiple interests and actors.
Project Management as Network
Management
In ANT perspective, managing a
system project is tantamount to managing the
project’s actor network. Only on the surface is
building an information system the technical
affair it is commonly taken to be. Instead,
creating a stable, heterogeneous actor network
is integral to the overall undertaking. This is
true not only when it comes to supporting the
construction of the technical artifact, but also
in establishing the web of relationships that
integrates the system into the business
processes of the organization.
A further lesson we can take from a
network view of the project is the need to be
alert to the proper scope of the actor network.
Figure 2a (above) suggests the potential scale
and complexity involved.
Network Management as Facilitation
What is also clear is the inherently
political nature of actor-network management.
Garnering the enrolment of, and commitments
from, key actors should always be regarded as
potentially problematic and a challenge to the
project leader’s skills in rhetoric and
negotiation.
The need for rhetoric and
negotiation suggests, in turn, that actornetwork management is not principally about
control, but instead is much more a matter of
persuasion and facilitation.
(Underwood
(2001) also makes this point.) The project
leader is not outside of the network, but is
really just one more actor within it. As such,

she can influence developments only from a
particular position within the network. The
possibilities for control are further limited by
the emergent, path-dependent character of
network evolution. Predictability is low, and
the project leader must rely more on
sensemaking and improvisation than on
forecasting and planning.
Even so, to the degree the project leader
is successful in getting herself centrally
located within the actor network, rhetoric and
negotiation can be powerful tools. At North
Bay, as one after another key actor became
enroled, and one after another defector became
marginalized, the project leader came to sum
up her striking level of influence using the
literary shorthand “lathe of heaven” – a
reference to Ursula LeGuin’s The Lathe of
Heaven (Le Guin 1971), in which the
protagonist’s dreams change the physical
reality that he awakens to.
Translation and Learning
The idea of “translating interests” is
obviously central to actor-network theory, and
any attempt to apply ANT in practice must
focus on this activity. Nevertheless, after
looking at a technologically lagging enterprise
like North Bay, it becomes apparent that there
are situations where certain “interests” may
hardly deserve the label. Now, although a lack
of organizational sophistication in IT will
make the immaturity of interests more
pronounced, this phenomenon is also likely to
occur even in more experienced organizations.
This implies that accomplishing translations
may not merely be a matter of alignment (as
the earlier quote from Walsham and Sahay
suggests), but may also demand the fostering
of sensemaking and learning (Fomin, Keil, and
Lyytinen 2003).
ANT analyses commonly assume
interests to be relatively stable (Allen 2004).
But in a systems project like the one at North
Bay, actors discover and define their interests
in a changing context of work that emerges
hand-in-hand with the introduction of the
system itself. Thus, even as participants weigh
in on issues of system design, they are
themselves transformed, “redesigned” as
organizational actors, as they learn about the
possibilities of the technology, establish their
own identities as system builders, and move
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toward a view of themselves as users that must
know certain things and work in certain ways
in order to function in the changing
environment shaped by the new system.
Accordingly, the project leader is wellserved by viewing the project not just as an
effort in system construction, nor simply as an
undertaking in network building, but also as an
occasion for organizational learning. Learning
on the part of key actors will prove
indispensable to the project leader’s efforts in
problematisation,
interessement,
and
enrolment. At North Bay, for example, the
project became a vanguard effort to create a
minimum threshold of business-side capability
in thinking about information technology and
information management in the firm. In short,
the project leader had to do more than just “put
in a system.” She also literally had to “change
people’s minds” – to transform managers and
users into the kinds of actors who could act
knowledgeably and effectively in their
engagement with IT.
The Politics of Representation
As the North Bay story makes clear, the
indirect representation of interests outside the
actor network was essential (again, see Figure
2b). Representation helped shape system
design in ways that would affect actors yet to
become part of the network. In other cases,
the interests represented would never become
active participants in the system project per se
(e.g., the clients, state funding agencies), but
were crucial participants in other actor
networks in which the system itself would
eventually function as an actor.
Of obvious concern to a project leader,
then, is identifying how the actors
participating within the actor network actively
represent others’ interests, in addition to their
own. Questions to ask include: Who is
speaking for whom, by what right do they
claim to do so, and how effectively do they do
it? These are crucial issues, because the
design of the system will be shaped in part
according to the representations put forward
by those who have a voice in the process. The
resulting inscriptions can have a potentially
significant impact on other members of the
organization. At North Bay, for example, we
witnessed the staff analyst speaking for the
interests of outside agencies, as he tried to get
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redesigns to system screens that would change
the work of the intake personnel.
Understanding representation is also important
because it can help the project leader to
anticipate where the attempted mobilization of
parties not previously engaged may come up
against
resistance
because
of
misrepresentation. This may influence crucial
decisions about the scope of participation in
requirements definition and system design, and
the management of power and authority in the
project. It can also affect how the leader
sequences and times her translation efforts, for
example, bringing certain actors into the
project earlier rather than later.
As noted, the project leader is not, in
Machiavellian fashion, above the actor
network, but is instead an integral part of it.
As such, she too is an agent of representation,
and will commonly be an active one, at that.
Being in this position demands more than a
modest amount of self-reflectiveness. Whose
interests should she be representing, and how
should these be served through system design?
The answers are not always clearcut, and
invariably involve political and ethical
considerations. They can also raise difficult
internal conflicts between the project leader’s
own interests and the varied interests of the
other participants directly, and indirectly,
involved.
Managing by Critical Issues
This paper’s presentation of the North
Bay story has used the device of critical issues
as the basis for its historical framework.
Critical issues, of course, also constitute real
matters with which the participants have to
contend. Managing a project’s critical issues
requires the leader to recognize them for what
they are and to deal effectively with their
particulars.
Critical issues, again, are situations that
present challenges to the extension and
stabilization of the project’s actor network, as
things move forward in time. These involve
problems in accomplishing the stable
enrolments of actants who emerge as essential
over the course of the project. Stabilization is
always a matter of degree, and subject to
reversal. It follows a complex, path-dependent
process that demands leadership that is alert to
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crucial developments, and that is then
persistent and creative in handling them.

closure on the features and capabilities of the
system.

Creating and maintaining stability in
the actor network also demands attention to
the details, as they emerge.
Effective
leadership, in this regard, is not a matter of
getting all the right pieces arranged at the
outset, and then sitting back and letting matters
take their course. As noted a moment ago, the
inherent limits to prediction make this a matter
instead for vigilant and mindful attention to
the facts (and interests) as they evolve. The
circumstances also call for a realistic view of
the scope of one’s own influence over events.

This paradox of stability, while perhaps
more clearly manifested in a systems project
conducted in the agile manner of North Bay’s,
is likely to hold more generally.
As
Holmstrom and Robey observe (forthcoming),
practically speaking an information system is
never really “black-boxed,” because the
system must continually evolve to meet
changing business needs. Their concept of
“negotiation loops,” then, expresses the idea
that a system should be open to a succession of
revisions without any necessary endpoint.
This leads us to another apparent paradox, of
which the project leader needs to be aware.
The institutionalization of a system – getting it
to a taken-for-granted status in the eyes of the
organization’s members (Scott 1995) – may
depend on a maintenance strategy that fosters
the system’s flexibility and readiness for
change.

Managing by critical issues also
suggests that timing is central. A critical issue
will develop in its own good time. The
specific pattern of extension in the actor
network must therefore be dictated by the
evolving project itself and the issues it
produces. Critical issues provide the salience,
motivation, and opportunities for learning that
actors need in order to engage in the network.
For the project leader, premature efforts to
translate particular interests are likely to be at
best a waste of attention and energy, and may
produce negative effects, including the
invoking or hardening of resistance.
Managing the Paradox of “Stability”
In applying ANT in the information
systems context, an important distinction must
be made between the stabilization of the
project’s actor network and the stabilization,
or “blackboxing,” of the system itself as a
technological artifact. The two things are not
the same (Fomin, Keil, and Lyytinen 2003).
While ANT studies often imply that there is a
strong correlation between the two – and some
studies perhaps even conflate them – in the
system development context we face a
seeming paradox. Accomplishing stability in
the actor network, in the form of appropriate
enrolments and strong commitments, may
actually be a prerequisite for successfully
suspending stabilization in the design, so that
the emerging system retains its plasticity and
adaptability. For example, at North Bay, the
project leader worked doggedly on lining up
allies faithful to the project and to the larger
idea of the new system. At the same time, she
directed the project using a consciously agile
methodology intended to forestall premature

CONCLUSION
This paper has considered the
possibilities for garnering practical insights
from actor-network theory for the management
of information systems projects. Drawing on
the particulars of an intensive field study, a
number of observations have been made about
how actor-network theory might be used not
only to produce a scholarly account of a
systems project, but also to help manage the
developments taking place in the project.
Although ANT has enjoyed growing interest
among IT academics because of its potential
for rich explanatory characterizations of the
course of project events, to date the literature
has offered relatively little in the way of
specific ANT-based guidance for management.
Accordingly, a primary contribution of this
paper has been to identify a number of issues,
cast around the central idea of actor-network
management, that may warrant managerial
attention in systems projects.
Such issues include finding the right
balance between a facilitative stance and a
control-oriented one; the potential need to
constitute interests, as well as to align them;
the hazards and pitfalls of representational
activity among project participants; the
handling of critical issues and phase shifts that
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present new challenges to the stability of the
project’s actor network; and the need to
manage the paradoxical tension between
network stability and system flexibility. Also
of crucial practical importance for managers is
the recognition that they, too, are part of the
actor network; as such, their own enrolment
and commitments demand serious selfreflective scrutiny.
The case study has also provided some
more general insights, with relevance to both
theory and practice.
One is that the
construction of a project’s actor network does
not necessarily start on virgin ground, but may
require the dismantling or disabling of actor
networks that already exist. Also, the very
design of the system itself will tend to respond
to the opportunities and limitations which the
existing fabric of the organization presents to

the construction of the project’s actor network.
In this regard, even the best efforts to plan
such a project must give way, by degrees, to
improvisation, as the project unfolds. Yet
another insight, not often explicitly considered
in ANT analyses, is the need to attend closely
to the effects on networks of actors’ entrances
and exits.
Although limited in generality by its
“sample of one,” the analysis offered here
nevertheless suggests some of the rich
possibilities for using actor-network theory to
advance the practice of information systems.
Future research in this vein would seek to
develop additional ANT-based stories for
projects in other organizations and, on that
basis, to refine and extend the guidance
outlined here.
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